Patent statistics: a good indicator for innovation in China? Assessment of impacts of patent subsidy programs on patent quality by Dang, Jangwei & Motohashi, Kazuyuki
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Patent statistics: a good indicator for
innovation in China? Assessment of
impacts of patent subsidy programs on
patent quality
Jangwei Dang and Kazuyuki Motohashi
November 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56184/
MPRA Paper No. 56184, posted 12. July 2014 03:23 UTC
IAM Discussion Paper Series #029 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
東京大学 知的資産経営研究講座 
Intellectual Asset-Based Management 
Research and Education Program 
The University of Tokyo 
 
※ＩＡＭディスカッション･ペーパー･シリーズは、研究者間の議論を目的に、研究過程における未定稿を
公開するものです。当講座もしくは執筆者による許可のない引用や転載、複製、頒布を禁止します。 
  http://pari.u-tokyo.ac.jp/unit/iam/index.html 
 
 
 
Patent statistics:  
A good indicator for innovation in China? 
Patent subsidy program impacts on patent quality 
 
 
2013 年 11 月 
Department of Technology Management for Innovation(TMI), 
School of Engineering, University of Tokyo  
Jianwei Dang 
 
Professor, Department of Technology Management for Innovation(TMI), 
School of Engineering, University of Tokyo 
Kazuyuki Motohashi 
 
IAM 
Intellectual Asset-Based Management 
 
 
Patent statistics: A good indicator for innovation in China? Patent subsidy 
program impacts on patent quality 
 
 
Jianwei DANG*, Kazuyuki MOTOHASHI 
Department of Technology Management for Innovation, School of Engineering, the 
University of Tokyo, Hongo 7-3-1, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-8656, Japan 
Emails: dangjw@gmail.com (J. DANG); motohashi @tmi.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp (K. MOTOHASHI) 
 
* Corresponding author: Tel.: +81 03 5841 8855; Fax: +81 03 5841 1829 
 
Jianwei Dang is Ph.D. candidate, Department of Technology Management for Innovation, 
Graduate School of Engineering, the University of Tokyo. He used to work in China Institute 
of Nuclear Technology Information and Economics. Currently his research interest lies in 
technology market and open innovation. He was awarded Master of Engineering from the 
University of Tokyo. 
Kazuyuki Motohashi is Professor, Department of Technology Management for Innovation, 
Graduate School of Engineering, the University of Tokyo. Until this year, he had taken 
various positions at the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of the Japanese Government, 
economist at OECD and associate professor at Hitotsubashi University. He was awarded 
Master of Engineering from the University of Tokyo, MBA from Cornell University and Ph.D. 
in business and commerce from Keio University. 
 
  
 
 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates whether patent subsidy programs to promote regional 
innovations have generated a large volume of low-quality applications in China, 
resulting in biased patent statistics as an indicator for innovations. We find that 
subsidies on patent filing fees encouraged the filing of low-quality patents, resulting 
in a decreased grant rate. Although grant-contingent rewards increased the patent 
grant rate, they also encouraged patents with narrow claim breadth. Our empirical 
results confirm a general concern that patent subsidies have side effects of 
encouraging patent applications of low quality or value. However, patent subsidy 
programs do not affect granted patent trends, particularly for those requested by 
businesses. Therefore, while the surge of patent applications exhibits upward biases 
as an innovation indicator, increases in granted patents can be explained by the 
increase of technological capability in China’s business sector.  
Keywords: patent, subsidy, quality, China 
JEL codes: O32 O34 O38
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1 Introduction 
A recent surge of patent applications in China has aroused significant research 
interest to investigate whether the surge indicates the essential growth of innovative 
capabilities of Chinese industries and a change from “imitation” to “innovation.” 
Although the rapid increase of Chinese patent applications can be explained by the 
nation’s technological catching up with international players in developed economies, 
patent quality concerns arise as studies have suggested that such applications are 
largely supported by local government patent subsidy programs (Li, 2012). Thus, can 
we rely on patent statistics as an indicator of innovation in China? Several studies 
have analyzed the determinants of patent application growth, but few have provided 
empirical evidence on the quality of these patents. It remains especially unclear 
whether patent subsidy programs have resulted in the deterioration of quality of 
Chinese patent applications. This study contributes to the literature from a 
“quantitative” to a “qualitative” perspective.  
Despite a surge of patent applications by domestic players in China, a natural concern 
is whether patent subsidy programs have generated a surge of low-quality patent 
applications, thus making patent statistics an exaggerated indicator of China’s 
innovative capability. Li (2012) suggests preliminary clues that patent quality was 
not affected as the grant rates of patent applications have not recently decreased. A 
recent increase pattern can be observed in not only patent filing data but also in the 
number of grants. Several studies demonstrate that Chinese granted patents have 
lower value than patents by foreign players (Thoma, 2013; Zhang & Chen, 2012). 
However, to the best of our knowledge, whether this low quality can be explained by 
patent subsidy programs initiated in the early 2000’s remains unstudied.  
Another question is whether subsidy programs affect different types of applicants. Li 
(2012) showed that subsidy programs have generally boosted applications from firms, 
universities, research institutes, and individual inventors. However, differences may 
exist among firms of different ownerships as studies have suggested that ownership is 
an important factor in Chinese firms’ innovation activities. Subsidy programs were 
originally established to promote “endogenous innovations,” favoring domestic firms; 
however, the policy itself does not exclude foreign funded enterprises (FFEs) from 
receiving subsidies.  
Therefore, this study investigates whether patent subsidy programs generate 
“strategic behavior” by domestic applicants and result in deteriorated patent quality 
and biased patent statistics. We extend the pioneering research of Li (2012) in several 
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directions by answering whether patent subsidy programs encourage excessive filing 
of low-quality patent applications, reflected in a low grant rate and narrow claim 
scope. Moreover, we investigate the effect of different policy designs on the timing and 
condition of subsidies, and using firm level data, we identify whether the policies 
differently affect state-owned enterprises (SOEs), privately owned enterprises (POEs), 
and FFEs.  
We classify patent subsidies into three categories reflecting their timing and 
conditions: filing fee, examination fee, and patent grant contingent rewards 
(hereinafter grant-contingent rewards), and empirically investigate their effects in 
the patenting process. Filing fee subsidies generated excessive applications that 
ended without examination requests, and examination fee subsidies increased the 
propensity of examination requests. Contrary to general observations that the patent 
grant rate should not be affected by subsidy programs, grant-contingent rewards 
generally increased the patent grant rate. Further investigation revealed that 
grant-contingent rewards encouraged strategies to narrow patent claims to obtain 
patents more easily. This policy effect is generally consistent among firms, 
non-business organizations (NBOs), such as universities and public research 
institutes; and individuals.  
This study contributes to innovation literature on studies in China. First, we provide 
solid evidence that patent subsidies generally generate excessive filing of low-quality 
applications and biased statistics, which must be addressed properly in innovation 
studies about China. Second, by detailed classification of patent subsidies, we 
empirically demonstrate the effects of different policy designs, findings that may 
provide useful policy insights. Most importantly, we find that although 
grant-contingent rewards help prevent low patentability applications, they encourage 
strategic patenting with narrow claims and low economic value, a trend which is 
undesirable for policy makers.  
The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the background and theory. 
Section 3 describes the data and variables. Section 4 presents our econometric results. 
Section 5 discusses implications for policy and academic research. Section 6 
concludes.  
2 Background and theory 
2.1 Discussion of Chinese patent statistics as an innovation indicator 
China established its patent law in 1985, and patent applications had been growing 
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rather modestly until the end of the 1990s. Since 2000, volumes of patent applications 
have surged dramatically. Applications from domestic inventors, in particular, surged 
at an annual rate of 30% from 1999 to 2009 (Fig. 1). The growing patent application 
numbers suggest stronger endogenous innovative capabilities. However, this surge is 
unexpected because China is still widely considered as a weak intellectual property 
regime (Keupp, Friesike, & von Zedtwitz, 2012; Zhao, 2006). Studies suggest that 
R&D intensification is unlikely to be the primary cause of this surge (Hu & Jefferson, 
2009); however, subsidy programs are important factors behind it (Li, 2012).  
 (Fig. 1) 
Rapid growth of patent applications in China is obvious given the technological 
production and market perspectives: Chinese firms’ quick catch-up of technological 
development and a more attractive market enhances patenting benefits. Successful 
Chinese companies, such as Huawei and ZTE, have grown rapidly in technological 
capabilities and market share (Motohashi, 2009), and patent aggressively in both the 
domestic and global markets1. However, studies reveal that the overall patent surge is 
unlikely to have resulted from R&D intensification (Hu & Jefferson, 2009). Several 
scholars list foreign direct investment (FDI) as a contributor to patent growth from 
the market perspective and assert that patenting by foreign firms increases the 
propensity among domestic innovators, who need larger patent portfolios, to create 
market barriers or achieve better positions in cross-licensing negotiations (Hu, 2010; 
Thoma, 2013) 
Studies have examined other hypotheses, including pro-patent legal changes and the 
exit of low-patenting-propensity SOEs (Hu & Jefferson, 2009). Li (2012) confirms with 
empirical data that subsidy programs established by local governments stimulate 
patent applications. Whether patent subsidy programs have caused Chinese 
applicants to file low-quality patents remains to be answered. Li (2012) finds that the 
grant rate of patent applications did not decrease in recent years and draws a 
preliminary conclusion that subsidy programs did not generate patent bubbles. 
However, various controls are needed to reach a solid conclusion.  
Several studies take another approach by comparing the economic value or quality of 
Chinese patents with those requested by foreign firms. Using patent renewal 
information in the Chinese patent office (SIPO), Zhang and Chen (2012) estimate that 
patents requested by domestic applicants have a lower value than those requested by 
foreign applicants, and argue that Chinese firms may patent under local policy 
                                                  
1 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd topped the list of PCT applicants in 2008 according to the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO, 2009). 
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demand rather than market competition (Zhang & Chen, 2012). However, a time 
trend analysis has not been performed to verify whether the lower value of domestic 
patents is a new phenomenon accompanied by the recent explosive growth of 
patenting. Thoma (2013) assesses the quality of Chinese patent applications in the 
European Patent Office (EPO), concluding that applications have shorter renewal life 
cycles. However, because of the high cost of patenting abroad, firms may patent only 
inventions with high economic value in the EPO or USPTO. Firms that actively 
patent abroad are generally larger, younger, and more export-oriented than those that 
patent solely in the domestic market(Eberhardt, Helmers, & Yu, 2011). 
One limitation of using patent renewal data is the inadequate timeliness because of 
the uncertainty of the life of newly granted patents. A widely used patent value 
indicator is the number of forward citations, reflecting patents’ technological 
importance (Harhoff, Scherer, & Vopel, 2003; Nagaoka, Motohashi, & Goto, 2010). 
Studies also use citation-weighted patent counts as a more precise indicator of 
innovation output (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2002; Hall, Thoma, & Torrisi, 2007). 
Unfortunately, SIPO does not document this information.  
Another approach is to quantify the breadth of patent claims by counting either the 
number of claims (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004) or the length of the primary 
independent claim. Although the number of claims is more widely used in the 
literature, it has not been well documented in the Chinese context, making it 
inappropriate for research with large datasets. Malackowski and Barney (2008) 
propose patent claim length (count of words) as a rough measurement of claim 
breadth and state the logic as follows: 
 While claim breadth cannot be precisely measured mechanically or statistically, 
counting the average number of words per independent claim in an issued patent can 
serve as rough proxy if taken from a sufficiently large, statistically relevant sample. 
That is because each word in a claim introduces a further legal limitation upon its 
scope.  
Meeks and Eldering (2010) also propose that claim length can serve as an initial 
measurement in determining the scope of claims. Because this method is free of the 
untimeliness limitation, we apply it to Chinese patent statistics to track the impact of 
patent subsidy programs on the patent quality.  
2.2 Patent subsidy programs and their impact on patent-based innovation indicators 
Patent subsidy programs were launched at the end of the 1990s in response to a 
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strong governmental concern about domestic firms’ technological competiveness after 
becoming a WTO member. To strengthen the awareness of intellectual property rights 
and encourage domestic firms’ “endogenous innovation,” the central government 
issued policy guidelines titled “Strengthen Technology Innovation, Develop High-Tech 
Industries, and Promote Industrialization (of Inventions)”. In response to this 
guideline, relatively developed regions, such as Shanghai, started promoting 
patenting activities of local enterprises in 1999. Other provinces followed, and 29 of 30 
provinces launched similar programs by 2007 (Li, 2012).  
Although the goals are the same, policy design varies among regions, and several 
governments have made considerable revisions to their policies. Li (2012) describes 
differences in budget constraints and subsidy amounts among regions. A more subtle 
difference is the timing and condition of subsidies for invention patents, which are 
more highly valued and are considered as being a better indicator of technological 
capabilities. Subsidy amounts for invention patents are significantly higher than for 
utility models or design patents.  
Applying an invention patent includes three processes: filing, requesting examination, 
and examination by the patent office (Yang, 2008; Zheng & Lan, 2010). The 
examination request can be submitted within three years after filing. However, an 
early request is encouraged as applicants must otherwise pay an application 
maintenance fee two years after filing. Renewal fees are charged to maintain a 
granted patent’s validity. Fig.2 illustrates the filing and granting procedure for 
invention patents and relative costs. 
 (Fig. 2) 
Fig. 2 depicts a typical case, and costs may vary slightly. For example, if a patent has 
more than 10 claims, the fee includes an additional 150 yuan for each extra claim. 
However, the examination and registration fees do not change with the number of 
claims.  
Local governments differ in their detailed subsidy conditions. Some governments 
subsidize only granted patents, intending to promote applications with a good 
probability of passing the examination. However, such programs may not provide 
strong incentives for patent filing because three to four years elapse between filing 
and granting patents, and the examination results are uncertain. Therefore, some 
governments provide subsidies in filing and examination stages, allowing the 
applicants to obtain subsidies immediately after patent filing or examination request. 
Applicants are not required to return the subsidies if the applications are rejected by 
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examiners. Another difference is the amount of subsidies. Some governments fully 
subsidize the filing and/or examination fee whereas others provide subsidies covering 
only 50%–80% of the fees. Grant-contingent reward can vary from 500 yuan (Hebei) to 
15, 000 yuan (Tibet). Some provinces set no rigid amount and provide subsidies on a 
case by case basis. Li (2012) first collected information on regional patent subsidy 
programs and identified the starting year of those programs. On the basis of this 
information, we checked the policy details in official documents published on local 
government websites and news reports or by telephone interviews of local officials 
and categorized the types and amounts of subsidies, as summarized in Table 1.  
 (Table 1) 
Table 1 reports the classification of filing and examination fee subsidy as “Fully” if the 
amount is equal to the fees charged by SIPO, and as “Partly” if the amount is unclear 
or less than the fee charged. Grant-contingent reward is classified as “High” if the 
amount is no less than 2000 yuan, and as “Low” if unclear or less than 2000 yuan. 
Some governments subsidize the filing or examination fee only after a patent is 
granted. As such compensations are contingent on patent granting, we classify them 
as “grant-contingent rewards” though policy documents identify them as “filing fee 
subsidy” or “examination fee subsidy.”  
The effect of subsidy programs on the quality of patent applications can be analyzed 
from two perspectives, patent grant rate (number of granted patents divided by 
number of total filed applications) and the value of granted patents. An application 
may not be granted in two cases: the applicant does not request an examination 
within three years after filing, or the invention does not meet the criteria of 
patentability, including utility, novelty, and non-obviousness. Therefore, a low patent 
grant rate may result from a lower rate of examination requests after filing and a 
higher probability of patent denial by examiners. For simplicity, we define the patent 
grant rate as the number of granted patents divided by number of examined patents. 
Thus, patent grant rate = examination request rate × patent allowance rate. 
Correspondingly, for one application, we have probability of grant = probability of 
examination request × probability of allowance. 
The effect of filing fee subsidies should be the simplest as they reduce patenting costs 
from the outset. One may attempt to patent a technology with a lower patentability 
when subsidies are available. Such applications have a higher probability of being 
rejected by the examiner, resulting in a decreased rate of patent grants. Moreover, 
filing fee subsidies may encourage filings of inventions with great market 
uncertainties. After filing, the applicant may drop the filed applications before 
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requesting examination if it is clear that the economic value of the patent is lower 
than the subsequent costs for examination and registration. Thus, filing fee subsidies 
can result in a lower examination request rate, and finally a lower patent grant rate.  
The effect of examination fee subsidies can be complex. On one hand, it decreases the 
total patenting cost and increases the patenting propensity, which may decrease the 
patent grant rate as more low-quality patents may be filed. On the other hand, 
examination fee subsidies may encourage applicants to request examination for 
patents that would have been abandoned because of low patentability or low economic 
value, resulting in a higher examination request rate. The total effect depends on 
which effect is dominant.  
Grant-contingent reward gives patent assignees economic benefits in addition to 
exclusive rights. Similar to filing fee and examination fee subsidies, it can increase 
the trend of patent filing, but it will not encourage filing inventions with low 
patentability as the reward is contingent on patent grants. Therefore, 
grant-contingent rewards should not affect the patent granting rate. However, 
grant-contingent rewards can encourage applicants to submit examination requests 
for inventions with good patentability, but low value. Although applicants may not 
benefit greatly from the exclusive rights of patents, they can benefit from the subsidy 
programs. The increased examination request rate results in a higher grant rate. One 
characteristic of low-value patents is a narrow independent claim because 
competitors can easily bypass the protected scope and develop similar products. If 
grant-contingent rewards encourage the filing of low-value patents, we observe 
narrowed claims.  
As described by Li (2012), individuals, universities, research institutes, and 
businesses receive essentially the same supports. The subsidy programs make no 
explicit discrimination between different types of businesses, except for Anhui 
province, which excludes foreign-owned and -controlled companies from receiving 
subsidies. However, subsidy programs’ implicit barriers may exclude foreign funded 
businesses because recent Chinese government science and technology development 
policies emphasize promoting “endogenous innovation” or “self-dependent innovation” 
(Liu, Simon, Sun, & Cao, 2011). Further, patenting by FFEs is more likely to be 
determined by their headquarters’ R&D output and marketing strategies, rather than 
local policy incentives.  
3 Data and variables 
3.1 Data 
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This study uses a combined dataset of patent information from SIPO and Chinese 
firm data provided by GTA Information Technology Company, Limited (GTA). 
Chinese patent data 
Patent data in China is available on the SIPO website (http://www.sipo.gov.cn/); 
however, it provides formatted data only with a subscription whose data covers all 
patent applications since 1985, when China established its patent system, and 
provides following information (Motohashi, 2008).  
(1) Patent application information of invention patents, utility models, and design 
patents, including application number, applying date, IPC classification, patent 
number of priority applications, applicants’ names and addresses, inventors’ names, 
and patent attorney’s name and address. For invention patents and utility models, 
the title, abstract, and primary independent claim are available; for design patents, 
the title and a short description are available. There is a time lag of 18 months 
between filing and publication of patent applications.  
(2) Examination information of invention patents, including examination request date 
and issue date of granted patents. Because patent examination generally takes three 
to four years after filing, a time lag exists in obtaining the result of the final 
examination decision.  
(3) Patent renewal information indicating whether a patent has expired because of 
unpaid maintenance fees. If the applicant pays past-due maintenance and late fees 
within six months, the terminated patent rights can be revived and the revival 
records are also available.  
The most important drawback of China’s patent data is inadequate citation 
information, a widely used patent quality indicator. Another limitation is that full 
claim information and patent descriptions are not currently available for automatic 
processing.  
This study uses domestic invention applications from 1998 to 2008 as the base dataset 
(Dataset A), including 592,547 applications. We limit our research to invention 
patents because they represent the major investment target of all regions’ patent 
subsidy programs, whereas some regions, such as Zhejiang and Anhui provinces, do 
not subsidize utility models and design patents. We truncate old applications before 
1998 to match firm data, which is available only since 1998. Patents requested after 
2008 are also truncated because their examination information is not available by the 
end of 2012. The time span is suitable for testing the subsidy programs as those 
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programs were initiated between 1999 and 2007. By text mining applicant names, we 
categorize applications by three types of applicants: businesses, NBOs (universities, 
public research institute, and government agencies), and individuals. 
GTA firm data 
GTA’s non-listed enterprise database is a rare data source for Chinese firms. It is 
based on investigations by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The data covers 
roughly 150,000 businesses from 1998 to 2002. More businesses were then added, and 
since 2009, it covers roughly 380,000 businesses. It includes firm profiles, such as 
name, ownership, location, established year, and industry, and financial information 
on assets, revenue, profit, and cash flow. The data covers 31 provinces in Mainland 
China. Shares of covered businesses in each province are proportional to their shares 
in China’s GDP. Thus, the data does not have a severe regional bias. The major 
limitation of this data is that information on R&D expenditures is generally absent, 
which may limit its usage in innovation studies. 
We matched patent data with enterprise information by names of applicants, enabling 
us to identify the ownership of the applicant. The matched dataset (Dataset B) 
includes 126,386 applications from 12,208 businesses, which accounts for 44.6% of 
domestic businesses’ invention applications filed from 1998 to 2008. However, those 
applications are highly concentrated, with the top 10 applicants contributing 46.4% of 
the total applications. Those applicants include Huawei and ZTE, which are known as 
aggressive patent applicants globally, and Hongfujin Precision Industry Co., Ltd. 
which is a subsidiary of Foxconn Technology Group. The firm-specific effects may 
cause bias in estimations, especially as sub datasets grouped by applicant ownerships 
are needed in this study. Thus, we exclude applications from the 12 large applicants 
which with large portfolios of more than 1,000 patents, and get a smaller dataset 
(Dataset B) of 60,244 applications from 12,197 businesses. We divide those 
applications according to the ownership of applicants: SOEs, POEs, and FFEs 
(including Hongkong-Macau-Taiwan invested businesses).  
3.2 Methodology and variables 
We use three steps to estimate the effect of patent subsidy programs. First, we use a 
probit model to estimate the aggregate effects of filing fee subsidies, examination fee 
subsidies, and grant-contingent rewards on the patent grant rate. We assume that 
before filing, the applicants have considered all available subsidies provided by local 
governments, including grant-contingent rewards. Second, we test whether 
grant-contingent rewards affect the claim breadth using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
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estimations. Finally, we use the Heckman two-step model to analyze whether the 
effect of grant-contingent rewards is reflected in the allowance rate. In all the three 
steps, we use both Datasets A and B.  
Dependent variables: 
Granted: dummy variable; equals 1 if an application is granted within four years of 
filing. 
Examined: dummy variable; equals 1 if the applicant files an examination request for 
a patent application.  
ClaimScope: inverse of logarithm of noun counts in a patent’s primary independent 
claim. We use the inverse because the number of nouns indicates a narrower claim 
scope.  
Patent granting takes 3.87 years on average after filing with SIPO. The examination 
process may last longer for some patents because of delays on both applicant and 
examiner sides. Thus, for a recently filed patent, we cannot obtain accurate 
information whether it will be granted. Thus, we use a time window of four years after 
filing, within which granting decisions have been made for 83% of domestic 
applications. The result is consistent when we extend the time window to five years. 
This study therefore sets a time window of four years to include more recent 
observations in the regression. 
Our measurement of claim breadth is based on Malackowski and Barney (2012), but 
with modifications. We count only the number of nouns, rather than all the words in 
the claims, because nouns represent more substantial technology factors and are a 
better proxy of “legal limitation.” As the Chinese language does not use spaces to 
separate words in a sentence, we use the ICTCLAS Chinese lexical analysis program 
developed by the China Academy of Science to separate and tag nouns. We separate 
process and usage patents from device patents by text mining of abstracts and control 
this in our regressions because the two types of patents have significantly different 
conventions in claim drafting. 
Independent variables: 
FileSub: category variable; 1 if filing fee is fully subsidized in the province where the 
applicant is located, 0.5 if partly, 0 if not. 
ExamSub: category variable; 1 if examination fee is fully subsidized, 0.5 if partly, 0 if 
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not. 
GrantSub: category variable; 1 if grant-contingent rewards are no less than 2000 
yuan, 0.5 if less than 2000 yuan, 0 if none.  
Non-device: dummy; 1 if the application is for a product or a device, 0 if it is about a 
method, process, or new usage.  
Experience: years between the current application and the applicant’s first 
application. The literature suggests that experienced applicants may be skilled in 
assessing the patentability of technologies, drafting strong application documents, 
and communicating with examiners (Thoma, 2013). Thus, we use this as a control in 
our models. 
The models include technology and year dummies. Technology dummies are 
generated from the NBER patent classification based on the IPC, including 33 
categories. Moreover, we include five regional dummies indicating whether the 
applicants are located in Guangdong, Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, or Zhejiang. These 
top five regions contributed 59% of domestic applications from 1998 to 2008. When 
using Dataset B, we use the logarithm of the number of employees (logEMP) to 
control for firm size effect.  
3.3 Descriptive trends 
(1) Patents examination request rate 
 (Fig. 3) 
Fig. 3 illustrates the trend of the patent examination request rate. Both domestic and 
foreign applications have exhibited a higher examination request rate since 2001. 
Foreign applicants and domestic NBOs have requested examination for most of their 
filed patents in recent years, whereas individuals more often let their filed application 
lapse without requesting examination, reflecting their budget constraints. The 
examination request rate of applications from individuals has decreased since 2004, 
despite the general growth trend, illustrating possible excessive filing. 
 (2) Patent allowance rate 
 (Fig. 4) 
Fig. 4 depicts the allowance rate of examined patents. Except for the year effect of the 
patent law amendment in 2000, patent allowance rate has been generally steady in 
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recent years. The allowance rate of patent applications from NBOs has been 
decreasing gradually in recent years.  
4 Empirical results  
4.1 Effect of patent subsidy programs on probability of patent granting 
Using Granted as the dependent variable, we estimate the effects of three kinds of 
subsidies on the granting probability with probit models. Table 2 reports that FileSub 
is negatively significant whereas ExamSub and GrantSub are positively significant in 
the estimations. The results are generally consistent in estimations with the 
sub-datasets of applications from businesses, NBOs, and individuals, except that 
ExamSub is not significant in the estimation using the sub-dataset of applications 
from NBOs. The results suggest that filing fee subsidies cause excessive applications 
that are dropped before examination or rejected by examiners. The positive 
significance of ExamSub reveals that the effect of examination fee subsidies on 
increasing the trend for requesting examination is more significant than its effect on 
encouraging low-quality applications. Grant-contingent rewards have a similar effect 
on increasing the examination rate. However, the positive significance of GrantSub 
may also result from its effect on increasing the probability of allowance. Table 2 
reports a negative significance of ClaimScope, suggesting that applications with 
narrower claim scope are more likely to be granted. In Section 4.2, we test whether 
grant-contingent rewards encourage applicants to file applications with a narrow 
claims scope to more easily obtain patent grants. 
 (Table 2) and (Table 3) 
Table 3 reports the results using Dataset B. Estimations using all applications in 
Dataset B produce consistent results with those reported in Table 2. However, in 
estimations using sub-datasets, the effects of examination fee subsidies and 
grant-contingent rewards vary across the categories of applicants. ExamSub 
significantly increased the probability of grants for applications filed by POEs, but 
decreased it for SOEs and FFEs, suggesting that the effect of examination fee 
subsidies on increasing the propensity of requesting examination is less significant 
than its effect on encouraging low-quality applications from SOEs and FFEs. 
GrantSub is positively significant for POEs, but is not significant for SOEs and FFEs, 
suggesting that grant-contingent rewards may increase the propensity of examination 
requests for POEs, but not for SOEs and FFEs.  
4.2 Effect of grant-contingent rewards on breadth of patent claims 
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We estimate whether grant-contingent rewards encourage applicants to file patents 
with narrower claims using OLS models. The dependent variable is ClaimScope. 
Table 4 reports that GrantSub is negatively significant and the results are consistent 
across the categories of applicants. The results suggest that grant-contingent rewards 
encourage more patents with a narrow claim scope, and thus low economic value. 
 (Table 4) and (Table 5) 
Table 5 reports the results of estimations using Dataset B. The result is generally 
consistent with that reported in Table 4. Although GrantSub is not significant in 
estimations with applications from SOEs and POEs, the coefficient is negative. 
GrantSub is significantly negative in estimations using applications from FFEs, 
suggesting that FFEs are also affected by patent subsidy programs.  
4. 3 Effects of patent subsidies on probability of patent allowance 
(Table 6) and (Table 7) 
Our probit estimation results in Section 4.1 demonstrate that grant-contingent 
rewards increase the probability of patent granting. However, it is unclear whether 
the effect results only from a similar effect to that of examination subsidies on 
increasing the propensity of examination requests, or whether grant-contingent 
rewards also increase the probability of patent allowance in the examination process. 
Results in Section 4.2 demonstrate that grant-contingent rewards encourage the 
filing of patent applications with narrow claim scope, which may result from a 
strategy to increase the probability of allowance.  
Direct estimation of the probability of patent allowance with examined patent 
applications has a self-selection problem (Heckman, 1979): applicants are more likely 
to select patents with higher grant probability. The allowance rate of examined 
applications does not provide a good estimation of the allowance rate of applications 
dropped before examination if those applications have been examined Bias can be 
significant because filing and examination fee subsidies can affect the decision about 
requesting examination. To test whether grant-contingent rewards increase the 
probability of patent allowance, we use Heckman two-step selection models. We use 
all applications as observations rather than using only examined patents and 
controlled for the selection effect in examination requests. Cross production terms 
between GrantSub and ClaimScope are included to test the interaction effects.  
Table 6 reports the results. GrantSub is positively significant in estimations without 
cross production terms between GrantSub and ClaimScope, suggesting that 
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GrantSub generally increases the probability of patent allowance when the selection 
effect in examination requests is controlled. An institutional perspective is that 
patent examination results are not affected by any types of subsidy programs because 
examiners make the decision of approval or rejection. However, the applicant’s actions 
can affect the outcomes of examination. First, applicants may make greater efforts in 
drafting better patent descriptions and responding to Office action (a document of 
reasons for possible rejection) from examiners if grant-contingent rewards exist. 
Second, applicants may narrow the breadth of claims to more easily obtain a patent 
grant. Our results in Section 4.2 suggest greater probability for the second scenario.  
When we include a cross term of GrantSub and claim scope in the models, the results 
vary across different types of applicants. For NBOs and individuals, the cross term is 
significantly negative, suggesting that the effect of narrower claims becomes stronger 
when grant-contingent rewards exist. However, the cross production term in 
estimations using applications from businesses produce a less significant, but positive 
correlation. Further testing demonstrates that the significance may result from 
specific effects of the two largest patent applicants, Huawei and ZTE, which 
contribute 36,457 applications among the 264,696 from businesses. When we exclude 
applications from these two applicants, the cross production term becomes 
insignificant and the other coefficients change only slightly. One explanation of this 
difference is that businesses are less likely to sacrifice claim breadth for a patent 
grant because they need broader patents to protect their products from imitation. 
Table 7 reports the estimation results using Dataset B. GrantSub is positively 
significant for POEs, suggesting that grant-contingent rewards increase the 
allowance rate of patent applications from POEs. However, GrantSub is not 
significant for SOEs and FFEs, which is consistent with the results in Table 3. The 
cross production terms show a slightly negative significance, suggesting that 
grant-contingent rewards may encourage some businesses to strategically narrow 
patent claim scope to more easily obtain the patent. However, this effect is not as 
significant for POEs as it is for NBOs and individuals. 
5 Discussion 
5.1 Patent statistics as a biased innovation indicator 
Our empirical results demonstrate that patent statistics are biased as a result of 
“strategic patenting” motivated by patent subsidy programs. This bias causes 
difficulties for studies on innovations in China. 
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An explicit bias lies in the increased low-quality patent applications, which are 
dropped without examination or rejected by examiners, thus distorting the correlation 
between statistics based on patent applications and granted patents. Li (2012) made a 
simple tabulation and found that, though many provinces have recently launched 
subsidy programs, the recent patent grant rate has increased (excluding the time 
window effects). However, the increased grant rate is more likely an effect of the 
examination fee subsidy, which increases the examination request rate. When 
investigating the allowance rate of examined patents, we observe a different outcome: 
widely adopted patent filing fee subsidies have decreased the patent allowance rate, 
and that effect is especially significant for NBOs. Although statistics based on 
applications have their merits in timeliness, it should be used with care for Chinese 
patents because of the policy bias. One difficulty in making adjustments is that the 
bias is unsystematic because different regions enacted different policies, and several 
regions have made substantial policy changes.  
An implicit bias lies in the quality of granted patents. Our results revealed that 
applicants strategically file patents with narrow claim scopes to obtain patents more 
easily after examinations. The quality bias between patents filed with/without 
grant-contingent rewards makes patent counts unreliable as an indicator for 
innovations. Although adjusting patent statistics using citation data is highly 
recommended in the literature, it is not practical for Chinese patents where citation 
data is not available. Patent count weighted by claim scope presents another practical 
option. 
However, it is noteworthy that the patent grant data is not as biased as the patent 
applications data. For NBOs and individuals, we have found the complementarity of 
grant subsidy and narrower patent claim to increase the probability of patent 
granting. However, businesses exhibit the opposite pattern. In samples including 
Huawei and ZTE, we found a positive and statistically significant cross term of 
GrantSub and patent scope. That is, a broader scope of patents is granted more often 
with the existence of a patent grant subsidy. This outcome suggests that the grant 
subsidy policy intent for indigenous innovation seems to work for the enterprise 
sector.  
Since 2000, when the patent subsidy program began, the share of enterprise patents 
has steadily increased to more than 50% of all patents in both filing and granting 
statistics. Therefore, the recent surge in granting patents may not be especially 
biased by the patent subsidy program, but can rather be explained by the enterprise 
sector’s increasing R&D expenditure. Table 8 reports the trend of R&D expenditure, 
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adjusted by GDP deflator, and patent statistics from 2000 to 2008. When we divide 
the entire period into two halves, 2000–2004 and 2004–2008, we find that the 
increasing speed of the patent propensity (patent/R&D) declines in the latter period. 
Therefore, we can conclude that patent granting data is not as greatly biased as 
patent filing data by strategic patenting behavior motivated by patent subsidy 
programs. 
(Table 8) 
5.2 Toward a better subsidy policy design 
Patent subsidy programs enacted by local governments have contributed to the surge 
of patenting in China. These programs have a positive influence in promoting 
recognition of intellectual property (IP) value, easing financially constrained SMEs’ 
burden of obtaining patents and encouraging inventions. These influences have 
significant meaning in a weak intellectual property environment such as China, 
which is transforming from “imitation” to “innovation.” However, our empirical study 
confirms a general concern that patent subsidies have side effects in encouraging 
low-quality applications. 
Policy makers should consider these side effects as we observe differentiated policy 
incentive designs in different regions, and several provinces have changed their policy 
from subsidizing the filing fee to giving grant-contingent rewards. The variety of 
practices allows us to analyze their effects and suggest implications for future policy 
modifications. 
The first question is whether subsidies should be contingent on grants. Our study 
provides evidence that subsidies before grants decrease the patent allowance rate, 
indicating that these subsidies encourage filing of inventions lacking novelty or 
non-obviousness. From the perspective of policy efficiency, grant-contingent subsidy 
or reward is a better choice for increasing granted patents, which is a policy target as 
many provinces treat the number of granted patents as an assessment of local 
innovative capability. Our results demonstrate that grant-contingent rewards 
improve the grant rate as well as the allowance rate.  
However, grant-contingent rewards are not perfect. They can prevent applicants from 
filing patents of low patentability, but cannot prevent them from filing patents of low 
value. Our empirical results revealed that grant-contingent rewards encourage filing 
of patents with narrow claim scope, which is a sign of low economic value. One 
incentive to do so is to increase the grant probability by sacrificing breadth of claims. 
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This reaction is more implicit and difficult to identify. This form of strategic reaction 
to policies is especially significant for NBOs and individuals, who may not use patents 
to protect real products. However, we should note that grant subsidy programs are 
beneficial to innovation incentives for the enterprise sector. 
A more complex issue is whether the examination fee should be subsidized. 
Examination fee subsidies have the same function as filing fee subsidies in 
encouraging more patent filings. It also has a similar effect to that of grant-contingent 
rewards in increasing the examination request rate and grant rate, as our empirical 
results demonstrate. However, it disables the filtering effect of the examination fee 
system. The examination fee requires an applicant to reconsider the patentability and 
economic value of its application after filing. For example, an applicant may discover 
a prior art making the patent unlikely to be granted, or he may become less optimistic 
about appropriation potential after filing. Requesting examination would not be 
economically beneficial in these cases. Dropped applications before examination can 
decrease patent examiner workload, but subsidizing the examination fee may weaken 
the motivation to make a careful assessment before requesting examination.  
Although a complete economic assessment of patent subsidy programs is beyond the 
scope of this study, our results provide empirical evidence of “strategic patenting” 
driven by various subsidies, which may represent an undesirable policy effect, thus 
necessitating continuing policy modification. 
6 Conclusions 
This study investigates whether patent subsidy programs promoting regional 
innovations have generated a large number of low-quality applications, and thus 
biased patent statistics as an indicator of innovation in China. Using patent 
application and examination data, we estimated the effects of filing fee subsidies, 
examination fee subsidies, and grant-contingent rewards. We find that filing 
subsidies have encouraged applications with low patentability, reflected in a lower 
examination request rate and lower patent grant rate. Although examination fee 
subsidies generally increase the patent grant rate, the effect results from a high 
examination request rate due to the lower financial burden for applicants. Although 
grant-contingent rewards do not have the limitation of encouraging filing applications 
of low patentability, they encourage applicants to strategically file patents with 
narrow claims, which indicate low economic value. This effect is especially significant 
for NBOs and individuals who usually do not need strong patents to protect real 
products. However, it should be noted that this bias is not found in the business 
sector; thus, overall patent grant statistics suffer less upward bias as a consequence of 
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patent subsidy programs.  
Our study makes several contributions to the literature on innovation studies in 
China. We extend the current literature on the effect of patent subsidy policies from a 
“quantitative view” to a “qualitative view.” We identified the bias in different stages 
due to strategic patent filing in response to policy incentives. We make the first 
investigation of how different subsidy designs affect the outcomes of patenting 
behavior.  
Moreover, our study suggests policy implications and questions. We provide solid 
evidence that subsidizing the filing fee generates low-quality applications. More local 
governments seem to have identified this problem recently as we observe that certain 
governments, such as Zhejiang and Hunan, have suspended the filing fee and 
examination fee subsidy and replaced it with grant-contingent rewards. However, the 
policy shift cannot prevent applicants from strategic filing of low value patents, which 
waste the government budget for promoting innovations. We observed a more complex 
effect for examination fee subsidies. Although these subsidies have increased the 
patent grant rate, the increase results from more examination requests for low 
quality or low value patents. That is, the subsidies hindered the filtering effect of 
examination fees and generated an excessive workload for patent examiners.  
We extend current studies on patent subsidy policies from the “quantitative” to the 
“qualitative” aspect of patents. Further research is needed to identify how these 
subsidy programs have affected R&D activities and intellectual property management, 
and whether they have achieved the goal of promoting “real” innovation output. As 
the aggregated statistics in Table 8 reveal, the patent propensity (patent/R&D) 
increases over time. Increases of patenting are beneficial to society in that more 
disclosure of inventions prevents potential duplication of research among players and 
increases the size of technology market. However, excessive patents generate 
complexity in the technology landscape and a “patent thicket” that stifles subsequent 
innovation. Understanding such social impacts of patenting is important for 
interpreting patent statistics as an innovation indicator. 
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Fig.1 Growth of invention patent applications in SIPO (1985~2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2 Filing and granting procedure for invention patents and relative costs in SIPO 
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Fig. 3 Examination request rate of invention applications in SIPO (1998~2008) 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Allowance rate of examined invention applications in SIPO (1998~2008) 
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Table 1 Summary of patent subsidy programs 
Province Start year Filing fee subsidies  Examination fee subsidies  Grant contingent rewards
Beijing 2000 Fully Partly No 
Tianjin 2000 Fully No No 
Hebei 2005 Partly No Low 
Shanxi 2003 Fully Fully No 
Inner Mongolia 2002 Fully Fully No 
Liaoning 2006 Fully No High 
Jilin 2004 Partly Partly Low 
Heilongjiang 2001 Fully No Low 
Shanghai 1999 Fully Fully High 
Jiangsu 2000 Fully Fully No 
Zhejiang 2001 - 2005 2006 ~ 
No 
No 
Fully 
No 
No 
High 
Anhui 2003 No No No High 
Fujian 2002 - 2005 2006 ~ 
Fully 
Fully 
Fully 
Fully 
No 
High 
Jiangxi 2002 Partly Partly No 
Shandong 2003 Partly Partly High 
Henan 2002 Partly Partly Low 
Hubei 2007 No No Low 
Hunan 2004 - 2006 2007 ~ 
Partly 
No 
Partly 
No 
No 
High 
Guangdong 2000 Partly Partly No 
Guangxi 2001 Fully Partly High 
Chongqing 2000 Fully No Low 
Sichuan 2001 Partly Partly No 
Guizhou 2002 Fully Partly No 
Yunnan 2003 2004 ~ 
Partly 
Partly 
Partly 
No 
Low 
Low 
Tibet 2004 Fully Fully High 
Shaanxi 2003 Fully No High 
Qinghai 2006 Fully Partly No 
Xinjiang 2002 Partly No High 
Hainan 2001 Partly No No 
Data source: the authors' collection from official documents published on local government websites and news reports or telephone 
interviews of local officials. 
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Table 2 Probit estimations of determinants of patent grants (Dataset A) 
 All  Businesses  NBOs  Individuals  
Granted         
FilingSub -0.264*** (0.00761) -0.467*** (0.0128) -0.0746*** (0.0158) -0.0785*** (0.0129)
ExamSub 0.183*** (0.00808) 0.298*** (0.0139) 0.00965 (0.0175) 0.0597*** (0.0129)
GrantSub 0.289*** (0.00743) 0.442*** (0.0122) 0.108*** (0.0157) 0.132*** (0.0126)
ClaimScope -0.229*** (0.00247) -0.257*** (0.00396) -0.216*** (0.00519) -0.213*** (0.00412)
Firm 0.314*** (0.00452)       
NBO 0.609*** (0.00778)       
Non-device 0.169*** (0.00385) 0.216*** (0.00590) 0.0553*** (0.00863) 0.154*** (0.00650)
Experience 0.0130*** (0.000435) 0.0274*** (0.00102) 0.0163*** (0.000548) -0.0220*** (0.00132)
Constant -1.869*** (0.0690) -1.757*** (0.198) -1.268*** (0.0866) -1.865*** (0.379) 
Year  
dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Region dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Technology 
dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Observations 581838  260596  113522  207720  
LogLik -359664.1  -165533.8  -72694.9  -117693.8  
chi-squared 62440.6  19328.1  6427.1  10612.6  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
Table 3 Probit estimations of determinants of patent grants (Dataset B) 
 All  SOEs  POEs  FFEs  
Granted         
FilingSub -0.303*** (0.0227) -0.110* (0.0640) -0.301*** (0.0254) -0.422*** (0.154) 
ExamSub 0.0848*** (0.0246) -0.259*** (0.0780) 0.195*** (0.0277) -0.319*** (0.102) 
GrantSub 0.224*** (0.0213) -0.0189 (0.0662) 0.277*** (0.0238) 0.0554 (0.0950)
Claim -0.271*** (0.00797) -0.219*** (0.0238) -0.276*** (0.00923) -0.327*** (0.0224)
SOE 0.0775*** (0.0190)       
FFE 0.0550*** (0.0157)       
Non-device 0.0750*** (0.0115) -0.0420 (0.0356) 0.0903*** (0.0136) 0.0517* (0.0297)
Experience 0.00807*** (0.00208) 0.00864** (0.00367) 0.0145*** (0.00299) -0.0375*** (0.00819)
logEmp 0.0132*** (0.00349) 0.00186 (0.0101) 0.0102** (0.00417) 0.0288*** (0.00974)
Constant -1.617*** (0.525) -5.975 (147.9) -1.548* (0.912) -1.273 (0.829) 
Year 
dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Region dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Technology 
dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 59429  6097  43176  10147  
LogLik -39379.0  -4019.9  -28525.7  -6539.4  
chi-squared 3336.3  389.1  2522.8  878.5  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4 OLS estimations of the determinants of patent claim breadth (Dataset A) 
 All  Businesses  NBOs  Individuals  
GrantSub -0.0494*** (0.00367) -0.0483*** (0.00598) -0.0333*** (0.00806) -0.0427*** (0.00592)
Firm 0.0165*** (0.00239)       
NBO -0.146*** (0.00423)       
Non-device -0.0992*** (0.00206) -0.0967*** (0.00293) -0.134*** (0.00499) -0.100*** (0.00355)
Experience -0.00361*** (0.000237) 0.00852*** (0.000511) -0.00501*** (0.000317) -0.0138*** (0.000684)
Constant -3.299*** (0.0374) -3.401*** (0.0983) -3.394*** (0.0493) -2.768*** (0.197) 
Year 
dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Region dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Technology 
dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 581838  260596  113522  207720  
Adj R-squared 0.105  0.0894  0.148  0.0803  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 OLS estimations of the determinants of patent claim breadth (Dataset B) 
 All  SOEs  POEs  FFEs  
GrantSub -0.0203* (0.0104) -0.0390 (0.0300) -0.0123 (0.0120) -0.173*** (0.0354)
SOE -0.0712*** (0.00989)       
FFE 0.0891*** (0.00816)       
Non-device -0.0921*** (0.00598) -0.118*** (0.0194) -0.104*** (0.00713) -0.0396*** (0.0136)
Experience 0.000291 (0.00108) 0.00661*** (0.00195) -0.00217 (0.00157) 0.00890** (0.00371)
logEmp 0.0162*** (0.00182) 0.000413 (0.00553) 0.0160*** (0.00220) 0.0292*** (0.00444)
Constant -3.794*** (0.276) -3.792*** (0.705) -3.242*** (0.482) -4.004*** (0.369) 
Year  
dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Region 
dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Technology 
dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Observations 59429  6097  43176  10156  
Adj R-squared 0.0747  0.104  0.0783  0.0693  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6 Heckman probit estimations of determinants of patent grants (Dataset A) 
 All Businesses NBOs Individuals 
Granted         
GrantSub 0.155*** 0.0795*** 0.240*** 0.292*** 0.0745*** -0.0750* 0.132*** -0.0645* 
ClaimScope -0.219*** -0.213*** -0.211*** -0.216*** -0.201*** -0.185*** -0.221*** -0.203*** 
GrantSub × ClaimScope  -0.0225***  0.0154*  -0.0429***  -0.0604***
Firm 0.208*** 0.208***       
NBO 0.438*** 0.439***       
Non-device 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.0243*** 0.0246*** 0.112*** 0.111*** 
Experience 0.00736*** 0.00735*** 0.0123*** 0.0122*** 0.00893*** 0.00903*** -0.0264*** -0.0264***
Constant -0.970*** -0.950*** -0.733*** -0.746*** -0.691*** -0.650*** -0.750 -0.660 
Examined         
FilingSub -0.437*** -0.437*** -0.853*** -0.853*** -0.347*** -0.347*** -0.156*** -0.155*** 
ExamSub 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.637*** 0.637*** 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 
Firm 0.398*** 0.398***       
NBO 0.784*** 0.784***       
Experience 0.0408*** 0.0408*** 0.0348*** 0.0347*** 0.0637*** 0.0638*** 0.00710*** 0.00713***
Constant 0.0968 0.0968 0.737*** 0.737*** 0.805** 0.804** -0.594* -0.593* 
         
Constant -0.117*** -0.115*** -0.881*** -0.889*** -0.327*** -0.305*** -0.283 -0.323 
Year  
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 592547 592547 264696 264696 114091 114091 213760 213760 
LogLik -551549.1 -551542.2 -244296.
0 
-244294.5 -83287.9 -83280.3 -216958.2 -216943.4
chi-squared 26071.7 26098.3 10936.6 10954.9 3697.5 3713.1 8555.7 8674.4 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7 Heckman probit estimations of determinants of patent grants (Dataset B) 
 All  SOEs  POEs  FFEs  
Granted         
GrantSub 0.103*** 0.00288 -0.0672 -0.239 0.150*** 0.0812 0.0174 -0.153 
ClaimScope -0.256*** -0.246*** -0.209*** -0.192*** -0.251*** -0.245*** -0.325*** -0.305*** 
GrantSub × ClaimScope  -0.0302*  -0.0502  -0.0207  -0.0539 
SOE 0.0460** 0.0460**       
FFE 0.0209 0.0203       
Non-device 0.0518*** 0.0520*** -0.0745** -0.0744** 0.0662*** 0.0663*** 0.0339 0.0349 
Experience 0.00447** 0.00443** 0.0110*** 0.0109*** 0.00744** 0.00741** -0.0448*** -0.0448***
logEmp 0.00289 0.00287 -0.0142 -0.0147 -0.00154 -0.00150 0.0192* 0.0188* 
Constant -0.621 -0.589 -5.279 -5.239 -0.484 -0.459 -0.703 -0.645 
Examined         
FilingSub -0.662*** -0.662*** -0.180* -0.180* -0.728*** -0.728*** -0.398* -0.396* 
ExamSub 0.546*** 0.546*** -0.0124 -0.0124 0.651*** 0.651*** -0.217 -0.217 
SOE 0.215*** 0.215***       
FFE 0.239*** 0.239***       
Experience 0.0323*** 0.0323*** 0.0203** 0.0203** 0.0276*** 0.0276*** 0.0688*** 0.0689*** 
logEmp 0.0467*** 0.0467*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.0421*** 0.0421*** 0.0608*** 0.0608*** 
Constant -0.703 -0.703 3.320 3.327 3.440 3.440 -0.533 -0.531 
         
Constant -0.394*** -0.395*** -0.246 -0.249 -0.644*** -0.644*** -0.632* -0.635* 
Year  
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 60244 60244 6139 6139 43901 43901 10204 10204 
LogLik -51912.3 -51910.9 -4863.9 -4863.5 -38618.7 -38618.3 -7819.8 -7818.9 
chi-squared 2331.2 2333.0 325.8 326.6 1679.0 1680.0 . 626.2 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 8 Patent propensity of domestic businesses and NBOs (2000~2008) 
 Businesses   NBOs  
Year Filed patents 
Granted 
patents R&D* 
Filed 
patents 
/R&D 
Granted 
patents/
R&D 
Filed 
patents 
Granted 
patents R&D 
Filed 
patents 
/R&D 
Granted 
patents/
R&D 
2000 6,906  2,488 537  12.9 4.6 1,897 1,365 359  5.3 3.8 
2001 6,204  3,714 616  10.1 6.0 2,661 1,890 404  6.6 4.7 
2002 11,102  7,102 765  14.5 9.3 4,628 3,490 487  9.5 7.2 
2003 16,005  9,744 907  17.6 10.7 7,481 5,649 548  13.7 10.3 
2004 21,342  12,178 1154  18.5 10.6 9,106 6,721 573  15.9 11.7 
2005 31,999  18,029 1411  22.7 12.8 12,030 8,624 654  18.4 13.2 
2006 45,633  24,845 1730  26.4 14.4 14,444 9,702 704  20.5 13.8 
2007 59,628  31,307 2005  29.7 15.6 17,095 10,793 769  22.2 14.0 
2008 80,284  37,781 2343  34.3 16.1 21,491 12,993 855  25.1 15.2 
2004/ 
2000 3.09  4.89 2.15  1.44 2.28 4.80 4.92 1.60  3.01 3.08 
2008/ 
2004 3.76  3.10 2.03  1.85 1.53 2.36 1.93 1.49  1.58 1.29 
* R&D expenditures adjusted by GDP deflator (unit: 100 million yuan), sourced from China Statistical Yearbook on Science and 
Technology (2010). 
 
